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STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether the lower court acted properly 
by granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, thus denying Plain-
tiff uninsured motorist coverage under the automobile liability 
policy issued by Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
(1) No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy 
unless this insurer or its agent shall mail or 
deliver to the named insured, at the address 
shown in the policy, at least thirty days' ad-
vance notice of his intention not to renew. This 
section shall not apply: 
*** 
(b) Where there has been nonpayment of 
premium 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-41-17. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Godoy filed this action seeking a declaration of coverage 
under an automobile liability policy issued by Defendant Mid-Century 
Insurance Company for damages he sustained in an automobile accident 
with John May, an allegedly uninsured motorist. Defendant denied 
Plaintiff's claim for coverage on the basis that the policy of 
insurance had expired by its own terms two days before the accident 
occurred and Plaintiff had failed to renew the policy by tendering 
his premium payment. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Group was dismissed from the lawsuit 
on September 3, 19 85. Although Defendant May was served with process, 
no Answer was filed in his behalf. 
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking 
the Court to determine that Defendants owed a duty of coverage, 
reserving the issues of bad faith and damages for trial. Defendants 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all issuers. After a 
hearing at which both sides presented oral argument, the Court granted 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Summary Judgment was 
signed on June 9, 1987. 
Statement of the Facts 
Mr. Godoy obtained an automobile liability insurance policy 
through Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company. The policy had an 
effective date of November 7, 1983, and an expiration date of May 15, 
1984. (R. 178-191) Premium payments were to be made by Mr. Godoy 
each month. No premium payment was received from Mr. Godoy for April 
or May, 1984, leaving an amount due of $40.12. (R. 165, 261) 
Defendants mailed to Plaintiff a "Notice of Cancellation — Non-
payment of Premium" which stated that the policy would terminate on 
May 15, 1984, if full payment was not received. (R. 203) 
On May 17, 1984, two days following the expiration of Plaintiff's 
policy, Mr. Godoy was involved in an automobile accident with John 
L. May, an allegedly uninsured motorist. (R. 3) Mr. Godoy submitted 
an application for no-fault personal injury protection benefits and 
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uninsured motorist benefits to Mid-Century Insurance Company on 
June 15, 1984. (R. 159) The Utah local office of Mid-Century 
Insurance Company began receiving statements for medical expenses 
incurred by Mr. Godoy and made its first payment for those expenses 
on June 22, 1984. The local office of Defendant Mid-Century Insurance 
Company issued six drafts totalling $1,082.00 for Mr. Godoy's medical 
expenses until August 21, 1984. (R. 163-164) A draft was subsequently 
issued on August 23, 1984, but a stop payment was placed on that 
draft. (R. 177) 
Mr. Godoy and Lourdes Godoy, his wife, contend that a money 
order for $18.00 was purchased won or about May 15, 1984," to pay 
the premium, but have produced no documentary evidence that the money 
order was purchased or mailed to the Defendants' address. (R. 136-
139) Defendants have denied receiving any payment. (R. 261) 
SUMMARY OF ARGOMENT 
The district court properly denied Plaintiff' s motion for partial 
summary judgment because there was no evidence that Defendant-insurer 
had waived its right to terminate benefits under the policy of insur-
ance. The only action taken by Defendant following the expiration 
of Plaintiff's policy was to pay six medical care providers over a 
three-month period. Such action is not sufficient to create a waiver 
of policy defenses and certainly not to reinstate a policy which has 
lapsed. Mr. Godoy could not reasonably rely on the payments to the 
medical care providers to reinstate his policy of insurance. 
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The district court properly granted Defendant-insurer's motion 
for summary judgment because the Plaintiff's policy expired by its 
own terms two days before the automobile accident for which he is 
claiming coverage. It was not possible for Plaintiff to reinstate 
coverage under the policy by merely mailing a one-month premium 
payment "on or about" May 15, 1984, the expiration date of the policy. 
A payment in excess of one month's premium had to be received on or 
before that date to continue the policy in force to May 15, 19 84, 
two days before the Plaintiff's accident. 
The Plaintiff sought to compel additional discovery from Defen-
dant. The judge properly ruled that, under the state of the facts, 
further discovery would not have benefitted Plaintiff in opposing 
summary judgment. 
Plaintiff further claims that Defendant-insurer acted in bad 
faith in refusing to pay additional medical claims after making a 
determination that the policy had lapsed prior to Plaintiff's acci-
dent. Since no policy of insurance existed at the time, the insurance 
company could not act in bad faith. Even if coverage had existed, 
the insurance company acted promptly in paying the medical claims 
and not unreasonably long in realizing its mistaken payment and 




THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff is attempting to create coverage where none existed 
at the time of his automobile accident. The policy lapsed by its 
own terms two days prior to the accident yet, in support of his 
motion for partial summary judgment, the Plaintiff argued that the 
Defendant insurance company waived its right to terminate benefits 
under the automobile liability policy by making six payments for 
Plaintiff's medical expenses over a three-month period following the 
accident. Plaintiff did not cite one case in support of his contention 
that payment of medical bills is sufficient to estop an insurance 
company from subsequently denying benefits. Indeed, Larson v. Wycoff 
Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981), holds that such conduct by an insurer 
does not create a waiver. 
The Court in Larson, supra, considered the situation of an 
employee whose benefits under the employer's insurance policy changed 
when he moved from full-time status to part-time status. Following 
the move, he submitted medical expense claims to the employer which 
were paid over a short period of time. A final draft was issued to 
cover the medical expenses but payment was later stopped. The Court 
rejected the Plaintiff's claim of estoppel, citing the language in 
Harding v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 83 Utah 376, 381, 28 P.2d 
182, 184 (1934): 
-5-
It would be unjust to both the employee and the 
insurance carrier if the law were that when the 
insurance carrier once undertakes to provide 
medical or other care for an injured workman it 
has lost all right to afterwards defend against 
what it believes to be an unjust or illegal claim. 
See also; Morrison v. Droll, 588 P.2d 383 (Colo. App. 1978). 
As in Larson, supra, Mr. Godoy, by his own admission, was aware 
that a premium payment was necessary to maintain the policy in force 
to its expiration date and that further payments would be necessary 
to reinstate the policy after it lapsed. The fact that the insurer 
made payments for certain medical expenses over a very short period 
of time did not in any way prejudice Mr. Godoy since payments were 
made for "necessary medical expenses." Those expenses would presum-
ably have been incurred regardless of the existence of insurance 
coverage. Further, once the policy had expired, as explained below, 
Mr. Godoy could not retroactively reinstate coverage for the loss 
which occurred shortly after the policy had expired. Thus, Mr. Godoy 
was aware that a payment needed to be made. He was not in the same 
position as Mr. Larson, who claimed he was prejudiced because he was 
unaware of a conversion option and was therefore uncible to take 
advantage of that privilege on his medical insurance. Mr. Godoy 
cannot be said reasonably to have relied on the existence of insurance 
coverage merely because of the medical payments made by Defendants. 
While Defendant may not be entitled to repayment of the sums 
it wrongly paid, it should not be estopped from denying that coverage 
existed at the time of the accident. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
THE DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
A. NO COVERAGE EXISTED ON 
THE DATE OP THE ACCIDENT 
Even accepting Plaintiff's contention that he mailed a one-
month premium payment on or about May 15, 1984, the damages for which 
he is claiming coverage were incurred after the insurance policy at 
issue had expired by its own terms. The policy and the Notice of 
Cancellation state that the policy expired effective May 15, 19 84. 
As stated above, Plaintiff owed a premium of $40.12. He is contending 
that, at most, he mailed a premium payment of $18.00. That action 
would have been insufficient to keep the policy in force to its 
stated expiration date and certainly would not have been sufficient 
to reinstate the already lapsed coverage. 
In order to continue coverage, payments must be received by an 
insurer before the expiration date. In Kimball v. Kingsbury, 27 Utah 
2d 70, 493 P.2d 300 (1972), the insured received a past-due notice 
for premium payment and mailed a check to the insurance company. 
The payment was post-marked the same day as an accident in which the 
insured was involved. The payment was not received until three days 
after the accident. The Court held that the payment was not timely 
and there was no policy in effect at the time of the accident. 
In the case of Pollock v. New York Life Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 961 
(10th Cir. 19 82), the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courtfs 
judgment for the insurer, holding that a life insurance company could 
deny coverage on the basis of the lapse of the policy for failure to 
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pay a premium even though the insurer had accepted a premium payment 
following the lapse. In the present case, Mid-Century has no record 
of even receiving the payment. 
The Plaintiff has contended that because Defendant cannot dis-
prove that he obtained the money order and mailed it to the Defendant, 
Defendant is somehow admitting that it occurred. Since Plaintiff 
is unable to document the payment, it would be impossible for the 
Defendant to do so. Defendant has denied receiving such a payment. 
(R. 261) 
The Court, in Butkovich v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 257 
(Colo. App. 1984), held that, absent an express agreement or course 
of dealing to the contrary, mailing of an insurance premium was not 
sufficient to constitute delivery where the Notice of Cancellation 
expressly stated that the premium was to be received at the office 
before the date of cancellation. In the present case, there is no 
express agreement or a course of dealing which would justify contin-
uing the policy in force beyond its stated expiration dcite. Indeed, 
both the policy and the notice state that the payment must be received 
by the office on or before its due date. 
Plaintiff's purported payment was not timely and not enough. 
The Plaintiff has contended that he mailed the payment on or about 
May 15, 19 84, the date the policy expired and two days before the 
accident. Thus, the payment could have been mailed after the accident 
occurred and certainly would not have been received before the policy 
expired. Regardless of when it was mailed, under the terms of the 
Notice of Cancellation (R. 203) and the terms of the policy (R. 188), 
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the payments had to be received, "on or before May 15, 19 84." Mr. 
Godoy did not accomplish this. 
Plaintiff contends that he mailed a one-month premium payment, 
"on or about May 15, 1984." Merely mailing the payment after the 
policy has lapsed would not continue the policy in force from the 
date it terminated by its own terms. Mr. Godoy's only claim is that, 
"on or about May 15, 19 84," he obtained a money order for partial 
payment of the premium due, $18.00, which would not have been suffi-
cient to reinstate the policy even if it had been timely received. 
In the present case, the policy lapsed two days prior to the 
accident involving Mr. Godoy. The statutory framework on which 
Plaintiff relies in his brief, Utah Code Annotated 31-41-15 and 31-
41-16 (1953), as amended, applies only to "cancellation" of a policy 
and not to the failure to renew a policy, as in this case. There is 
no statutory requirement for notice in the case of non-renewal if 
there has been non-payment of premium, as in this case. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 31-41-17. 
It was not necessary for Defendant to mail a notice to Mr. Godoy 
and it cannot be said that the notice in any way misrepresented the 
state of the policy such that Mr. Godoy could reasonably have relied 
on a continuation of the policy beyond the expiration date. 
The Notice to Mr. Godoy specifically stated that the entire 
payment for two months, $40.12, had to be received by Defendant on 
or before May 15, 1984, or the policy would be cancelled effective 
that date. Plaintiff could not have complied with the Notice of 
Cancellation or the policy provisions merely by mailing a money order 
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in the amount of $18.00 to Defendant on or after May 15, 1984. Since 
no payment was ever received by Defendant, no coverage existed on 
the date of the accident. 
B. ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
WOULD NOT HAVE DEVELOPED AN 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL PACT TO 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff has contended that Defendant's summary judgment should 
not have been granted because discovery was not yet complete at the 
time of hearing. The Plaintiff had filed a motion to compel additional 
answers to discovery requests which had already been answered by the 
Defendant. That motion was heard at the same time as the cross-
motions for summary judgment. At the time of that hearing, the 
District Court Judge denied the motion to compel on the basis that 
none of the information sought by Plaintiff was discoverable and, 
further, even if the discovery was allowed, it would not change his 
decision. 
Even if the Plaintiff had been allowed to pursue additional 
discovery, it would not have raised an issue of material fact to 
preclude summary judgment. In the present case, the policy had 
lapsed even before the Plaintiff purportedly mailed his premium 
payment and, as stated above, merely mailing the payment is not 
sufficient to constitute delivery. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS OF BAD FAITH ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The Defendant-insurer did not act in bad faith by denying 
coverage. No policy of insurance existed at the time of the accident 
for which Plaintiff claims coverage and, therefore, no duty existed 
between Plaintiff and Defendant with regard to claims occurring after 
the policy expired. Further, Mid-Century Insurance Company did not 
take an unreasonably long time to determine and advise Plaintiff 
that his policy had lapsed prior to the automobile accident. Plaintiff 
has made no allegations sufficient to sustain his claim of bad faith 
against the Defendant. 
The Utah Court, in the case of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), set the standard for evaluating whether 
an insurance carrier has acted in bad faith. The carrier, at a 
minimum, must act unreasonably in denying a claim. In the present 
case, there was no policy in force at either the time of the accident 
or at the time of the denial of benefits. The only possible act 
which the Plaintiff could suggest was unreasonable is declining to 
pay further benefits after a determination that no policy was in 
force. As explained above, it would be patently unfair to require 
the Defendant to continue to make payments when a determination was 
made within three months following receipt of the notice of claim 
that no coverage existed. Harding, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
This Court should uphold that ruling. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£ day of K/1 (Zj^-^t* . 1987. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents 
^INSA L.W. ROTH 
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